FIPS Security Policy Updates for Heartbleed

(Image from heartbleed.com)

A month after the Heartbleed vulnerability was made public [Reference: CVE-2014-0160 National Vulnerability Database], and vendors with FIPS Crypto Modules are failing to do this one important thing.

In the FIPS 140-2 Security Policies I sampled, I have not found any affirming statements that the Modules supporting TLS or DTLS are safe from the Heartbleed bug. Customers are going to ask the Heartbleed question; why not be proactive in providing information?

If the security of your FIPS Crypto Module is not at risk to the Heartbleed vulnerability, then here are some sample statements that you are free to use (please modify as necessary) for inclusion in your FIPS 140-2 Security Policy:

The [Crypto_Module_Name] implements OpenSSL [1.0.1g] which properly handles Heartbeat Extension packets. This Module is not susceptible to the Heartbleed vulnerability.

The OpenSSL version implemented in the [Crypto_Module_Name] has been patched to properly handle Heartbeat Extension packets. This Module is not susceptible to the Heartbleed vulnerability.

The [Crypto_Module_Name] implements OpenSSL [1.0.1c] and has been compiled with the flag -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS which properly handles the Heartbeat Extension packets. This Module is not susceptible to the Heartbleed vulnerability. 

The [Crypto_Module_Name] does not implement OpenSSL for TLS [or DTLS]. This Module is not susceptible to the Heartbleed vulnerability.

Please contact me if you have questions about the Heartbleed bug and FIPS 140-2.

Mark Minnoch is an Account Manager at InfoGard Laboratories.